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ANTIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTIES IN A 
WESTERN HEMISPHERIC FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (WHFTA)
The use of antidumping (AD) duties and countervailing 
duties (CVDs) to prevent or remedy unfair trade practices has 
been an important issue during recent multi- and bi-lateral 
trade negotiations. They are important because parties differ 
on the role unfair trade remedies should play in trade policy, 
and this difference has led to inconsistent applications of 
these remedies among GATT Contracting Parties (CPs). The result 
is an 'uneven playing field' between trading partners.1 It has 
become evident that more standardized rules and procedures 
governing the application of these remedies are required. 
Whether these will be developed in the near future is largely 
dependent on the outcome of the Uruguay Round, where draft 
Codes have been drawn up dealing with dumping and AD duties, as 
well as subsidies and CVDs. In the meantime, other measures 
must be considered for inclusion in regional agreements to 
achieve the desired security of access to a trading partner's 
market in order to foster economic growth in a competitive 
environment.
The application of AD duties and CVDs by the United States 
was one of the major Canadian grievances that surfaced during
*J. Michael Finger and Andrzej Olechowski, eds., The 
Uruguay Round: A Handbook for the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1987, 155.
the negotiation of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA).2 
Initially Canada tried to gain a blanket exception from U.S. 
trade remedy laws, but this was unobtainable. As an 
alternative, Canada placed considerable effort on negotiating a 
dispute settlement mechanism into the FTA that would in 
particular reduce Canada's exposure to the use of AD duties and 
CVDs by the United States.
The dispute settlement mechanism ultimately incorporated 
into Chapter 19 of the FTA provides for the judicial review of 
AD and CVD duty actions by means of binational panels.3 More 
specifically, it provides exporters and importers the option of 
taking a disputed AD or CVD action to a binational panel with 
binding powers in lieu of seeking judicial review by a domestic 
court. Because individuals from both the United States and 
Canada sit on the panels, it is generally assumed that 
binational panels promote greater consistency and objectivity 
in AD and CVD practices. Perhaps because of these 
characteristics, it has been one of the most successful dispute 
settlement mechanisms developed in recent years.
There is no question that the initiation of a AD or 
countervailing action, as well as the imposition of a duty 
itself, can have serious consequences for exporters or
2Gilbert R. Winham, Trading with Canada: The Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement. New York: Priority Press Publications,
1988, 38.
3FTA, Article 1904.
importers. Given the seriousness of the interests at stake, 
combined with the tendency towards increasing use of unfair 
trade remedies, it is important that consideration be given to 
negotiating an FTA-like mechanism for the resolution of AD and 
CVD disputes into a prospective WHFTA.
The success of the FTA Chapter 19 mechanism leads somewhat 
obviously to its consideration as a model for a WHFTA. What 
remains at issue is whether this mechanism can be applied 
effectively in a considerably broader trade agreement such as a 
WHFTA, given the differences that exist between the legal and 
administrative practices of the prospective negotiating 
parties. The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the 
obstacles and implications of extending the FTA's Chapter 19 
dispute settlement mechanism to a WHFTA by using Mexico as a 
reference point for the discussion. Mexico is chosen because 
the negotiation of Chapter 19 in the NAFTA raised many of the 
problems that may later be encountered either in extending 
NAFTA to new members or in creating a broader hemispheric trade 
agreement.
To appreciate the significance of a Chapter 19 mechanism 
for a WHFTA or NAFTA, it is first necessary to look at the 
historical development of AD and CVD actions in international 
trade. The purpose of this review is twofold. First, it serves 
to set out the basic tenets underlying the creation of these 
measures to remedy unfair trade practices. Second, it 
illustrates the parallel that exists between Canada's
bargaining position under the FTA to that of Mexico and other 
WHFTA nations vis-a-vis the United States, thereby emphasizing 
the need for a binding dispute settlement mechanism in a WHFTA. 
A discussion of the major provisions of Chapter 19 and its 
application to date will follow this historical analysis.
I . History and Development of AD and CVDs
One of the primary objectives of the GATT is to promote 
secure access to foreign markets in order that businesses will 
feel confident that when they export their products they will 
encounter no unfair or unforeseen impediments in competing for 
a portion of the consumer market. Dumping and unrestricted 
subsidization have long been recognized as serious obstacles to 
this objective. Dumping is generally understood as the sale of 
goods on a foreign market at a price which is less than that at 
which the product is sold on the seller's domestic market, 
whereas a subsidy is the granting of a benefit, usually by 
government, at any stage of a good's manufacture, production or 
export.
A general concern about the harmful effects of dumping and 
subsidization resulted in their inclusion in the GATT 
negotiations in 1947. These negotiations concluded with the 
insertion of a remedy under Article VI of the Final Agreement, 
which allows CPs to the GATT to take unilateral action to 
offset the effects of dumping or subsidies on their domestic
4
industry through the use of AD and CVDs.4
Article VI allows the application of an AD duty against an 
imported good where it is being dumped on the foreign market 
and is causing or threatening to cause "material injury to an 
established industry ... or materially retard[s] the 
establishment of a domestic industry." A CVD may be applied to 
an imported good to offset the effects of a foreign subsidy 
where it also causes or threatens to cause injury to the 
domestic industry or the potential development of such 
industry.
The GATT provisions for AD and CVDs represented minimal 
commitment to any real control over these practices, and 
consequently these trade remedies became protectionist devices 
in themselves. This realization paved the way for the creation 
of Antidumping and Subsidies Codes during the Kennedy and Tokyo 
Rounds in 1969 and 1979 respectively. The purpose of these 
Codes was to define more precisely the conduct expected of CPs 
in their investigation and assessment of dumping and subsidy 
practices so that the free flow of goods was not jeopardized by 
their unfair usage.
The first Antidumping Code, concluded in 1967, was 
replaced in 1979 by a new Code,5 which sets out more explicit
4John H. Jackson and Edwin A. Vermulst, eds., Antidumping 
Law and Practice: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: The 
University of Michigan Press, 1989, 6.
Officially titled: Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
requirements governing a country's conduct of its antidumping 
and injury investigations, and the application of duties or 
price undertakings. The new Code has been largely successful in 
achieving a greater standardization of antidumping practices 
amongst CPs.6
In contrast, the Subsidies Code,7 also negotiated during 
the Tokyo Round, has not been as useful in standardizing world 
practice. Like the Antidumping Code, the Subsidies Code imposes 
some greater procedural requirements upon signatories with 
respect to evaluating subsidies and assessing CVDs. However, 
owing to the conflict between trading nations on the legitimacy 
of subsidies in domestic economies, and hence a lack of 
cooperative support, the Subsidies Code is essentially weak 
international’law. Moreover, unlike the Antidumping Code the 
Subsidies Code has not yet been incorporated into GATT, 
although signatories are obliged to implement its provisions 
into their domestic laws.8
Whereas dumping is generally considered an unfair 
practice, all forms of subsidies are not necessarily considered 
unfair and, therefore, countervailable. In its preamble, the 
Subsidies Code recognizes the dual nature of subsidies: that
6Finger and Olechowski, ibid.. 156.
Officially, Agreement on Interpretation and Application 
of Article VI, XVI, and XXIII of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade.
Other Latin American and Caribbean states that signed the 
Subsidies Code in 1979 are: Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay.
6
they can be instrumental in promoting important domestic policy 
objectives, while at the same time possibly harming a foreign 
industry's competitiveness. The Code's objective in defining 
when and how a subsidy may be countervailed is to balance the 
harm of a subsidy against the injurious effects of a CVD.
As between member states, there is considerable disparity 
in the application of subsidies and CVDs.9 By far the most 
important country on this matter is the United States. The U.S. 
Government takes a strong position opposing the use of 
subsidies, and it has been the most frequent user of the CVD 
mechanism in an effort to protect U.S. producers from 
competition with subsidized imports. Subsidies and CVDs 
therefore become important trade issues for nations with 
extensive trade with the United States.
1. U.S. Policy on AD duties and CVDs
As a signatory to both Codes, the United States 
implemented the provisions of each through the Trade Agreements 
Act (TAA) of 1979. The Act restructured the U.S. unfair trade 
remedy system in a politically significant manner. From 1954 to 
the enactment of the TAA, bureaucratic responsibility for the 
trade remedy system had been divided between the Treasury 
Department, which made determinations of dumping or subsidy, 
and the International Trade Commission (ITC), which handled
9J. Michael Finger and Julio Nogues, "International 
Control of Subsidies and Countervailing Duties", The World Bank 
Economic Review 1:4, 712.
determinations of injury. In 1979, responsibility for the 
former was shifted to the International Trade Administration of 
the Department of Commerce. Since that Department was perceived 
as being more sympathetic to importers than Treasury had been, 
this was widely regarded as a move to facilitate the use of 
trade remedies by U.S. constituents.10
Title VII of the TAA incorporated the Tokyo Round 
Antidumping Code into U.S. domestic law, but in the process 
several modifications were made. First, enhanced access to the 
information accumulated and used in AD duty cases was provided 
to importers and exporters of goods under investigation.
Second, regional markets were given standing to initiate AD 
cases. Third, importers were given greater influence in 
negotiating undertakings by exporters in lieu of AD duties, and 
a fourth change made it easier for petitioners to initiate AD 
cases. The combined effect of these changes was to facilitate 
AD actions.
Regarding CVDs, the main impact of the TAA of 1979 was to 
incorporate the Tokyo Round Subsidy Code into U.S. legislation, 
and especially to introduce a material injury requirement into 
U.S. CVD practice. The obligation to demonstrate injury (on 
products coming from Subsidy Code signatories only) was an 
important change to U.S. producers, although it would appear
10Rodney de C. Grey, United States Trade Policy 
Legislation: A Canadian View. Montreal: The Institute for 
Research and Public Policy, 1982, 56.
that the requirement of "material" injury likely did not add 
much.11 Other procedural changes in the TAA facilitated CVD 
petitions and administrative procedure.12
The greater transparency in the rules and regulations, as 
well as procedural requirements governing AD and CVD actions 
incorporated into the TAA, made it easier for importers in the 
United States to petition for AD or CVD actions, and to seek
"Material injury was defined in the TAA as "harm which is 
not inconsequential, immaterial or unimportant," Section 
771(7). Washington trade lawyer, Matthew Marks has observed: "I 
can only conclude ... that the substitution of a material 
injury standard of simple injury under the Trade Act of 1979 
has had little, if any, effect on the Commission's 
administration of the Anti-Dumping Act and countervailing duty 
law to date". Text of letter of 31 July 1980 of Matthew Marks 
to Rodney Grey, cited in Grey, ibid.. 46.
12Prior to the TAA, the Trade Act of 1974 had expanded CVD 
procedures in U.S. law, especially regarding judicial review. 
The Act provided for a right of appeal to a Customs Court, 
which later became the Court of International Trade (CIT). 
Manufacturers and producers in the United States were given 
standing to pursue an appeal. Previously, only importers had 
that right. Additionally, parties were given the right to have 
judicial review of negative findings and to challenge the 
amount of a CVD finding in addition to the finding itself.
The Trade Act of 1974 both facilitated the use of CVDs and 
it improved the procedural safeguards associated with those 
procedures. For example, writing about the pre-1974 period, 
Stanley Metzger has noted, "[o]ne of the most striking aspects 
of countervailing duty administration in the United States is 
the almost total lack of procedural safeguards in official 
proceedings. Neither statute, nor regulations make any 
provision for hearings and the usual ancillary procedures 
according substantial elements of procedural due process to 
parties or countries affected by a countervailing duty 
imposition. The lack of procedural safeguards is peculiarly 
disturbing in view of the very great discretion delegated to 
the secretary of the treasury and, through him, to the Bureau 
of Customs." Stanley D. Metzger, Lowering Nontariff Barriers: 
U.S. Law. Practice and Negotiating Objectives. Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979, 105.
review of those actions through the judicial system. The result 
was a sharp increase in the number of actions launched by the 
U.S. since the amendments brought about by the TAA (and the 
Trade Act of 1974) . Prior to 1970 the United States only 
occasionally resorted to AD or CVD actions; for example, as 
noted by Hart: "[b]etween the enactment of the final 
countervailing duty statute in 1897 and 1969 only some 65 
countervailing duty orders were issued, roughly one a year."13 
This contrasts sharply with the situation immediately following 
passage of the TAA, where the United States initiated 280 CVD 
investigations over the period 1980-1985.14 Against Canada, the 
United States initiated eleven new CVD cases over the period 
1980-1987 .
There are two approaches to the use of AD and CVDs. On the 
one hand, these measures can be seen as an attempt to remedy or 
offset unfair trade practices by foreign governments or 
exporters. Alternatively, they can be seen as a system of 
contingency protection, or "measures of 'stand-by protection' 
or techniques of administered trade."15 Contingency protection 
is especially provided on the initiative of specific industries
1 0
13Michael Hart, "The Future on the Table: the Continuing 
Negotiating Agenda under the Canada-United States Free-trade 
Agreement", Paper presented at a Conference held at the 
University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law (Common Law), May 5, 1989, 
39.
14Finger and Nogues, ibid. . 708.
15Grey, ibid. . 8.
on the basis of a complicated body of trade regulations. The 
system is discrete and highly legalistic, and it is an 
alternative to a more general approach to trade policy based on 
multilateral tariff reductions or codes of conduct. The use of 
contingency protection - or trade remedies - increased in the 
1980s, but whereas the incidence of AD duties is fairly evenly 
distributed between trading nations, CVDs are principally a 
U.S. policy instrument.16 As aptly described by Patrick 
Messerlin, "[t]o the United States, the [Subsidies] [C]ode is 
an instrument to control subsidies. To the rest of the world, 
it is an instrument to control U.S. countervailing duties."17
II. The Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement
In view of the frequent use by the United States of unfair 
trade remedies during the 1980s, especially countervailing 
duties, Canada recognized the need to achieve more secure 
access to the U.S. market under the FTA given its high 
dependence on trade with that country and the likelihood of its 
increased dependence in the future. Security of access 
therefore became one of the major goals of Canada in the FTA 
negotiation.
11
,6Finger and Nogues note that over 1980-1985, AD actions 
initiated by three GATT CPs were as follows: United States,
280; EC, 254; and Canada, 219; 708.
I7Patrick Messerlin, "Public Subsidies to Industry and 
Agriculture and Countervailing Duties." Paper prepared for the 
European Meeting on the Position of the European Community in 
the New GATT Round. Spain, October 2-4, 1986, as referred to in 
Finger and Olechowski, ibid.. 156.
During the negotiations Canada originally hoped to achieve 
an exclusion from the scope of U.S. unfair trade remedy laws. 
However, the United States never considered this proposal a 
serious option. Canada's alternate suggestion, that a list of 
'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' subsidies be established by the 
parties, similarly came to an impasse.
Canada's lack of success in negotiating the inclusion of 
either of these proposals into the FTA led it to suggest the 
adoption of an interim dispute settlement mechanism, in the 
belief that this would give Canada some indirect control over 
the use of U.S. trade remedy laws against Canadian goods. For 
Canada, the mechanism was fundamental to closing a deal. Had 
the proposal been rejected by the United States, Canada would 
not have signed the Agreement. Only hours before the deadline, 
the United States agreed to a binding dispute settlement 
mechanism covering AD and CVDs.
Dispute settlement on AD and CVDs is included in Chapter 
19 of the FTA and it has three parts. First, the parties agreed 
to continue negotiating on dumping and subsidy issues and to 
establish alternative rules in seven years if possible. A 
Working Group was created to pursue this task, but both 
countries agreed to negotiate issues of dumping and 
subsidy/countervail in the multilateral Uruguay Round in lieu 
of bilateral talks. Unless an agreement is reached at the 
Uruguay Round, it seems unlikely that a new AD or CVD regime
12
will be established in the North American context.
Second, the parties agreed that amendments to either 
country's AD or CVD laws would be subject to constraints of 
notification and consultation, and that such amendments would 
be consistent with relevant provisions of the GATT and other 
multilateral accords, and the FTA itself. Additionally, parties 
agreed to submit proposed legislative changes to a binational 
panel (see below) for an advisory opinion on the consistency of 
the change with existing obligations under international law.
Third, the parties established binational panels to 
replace judicial review by domestic courts of final AD or CVD 
determinations by national agencies. Each party agreed to 
retain its own AD and CVD practices - which were fairly similar 
in any case - and to make available binational panels to 
persons who would otherwise have been entitled to judicial 
review under domestic law. The panel's mandate is to consider 
the administrative record of the case appealed and decide 
generally, whether the final determination has been made in 
accordance with the applicable domestic law.18
Panels are composed of five members chosen from a roster 
of trade experts, primarily lawyers, established in each 
country. Two panelists are selected by each country while the 
fifth member is chosen jointly, or by lot, where there is no 




nationality has alternated between the two countries from one 
panel to the next.
The standard of review to be applied by the panel is the 
standard applicable in the country where the AD or CVD was 
made. In Canada, the test is whether the agency (a) failed to 
observe a principle of natural justice or otherwise acted 
beyond or refused to exercise its jurisdiction; (b) erred in 
law in making its decision or order, whether or not the error 
appears on the face of the record; or (c) based its decision or 
order on an erroneous finding of fact that was made in a 
perverse or capricious manner or without regard to the material 
before it. In the United States the test is whether the 
agency's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence on the 
record, or is otherwise not in accordance with the domestic 
laws.19
It is important to note that the panels are not authorized 
to create substantive law but must act consistently with the 
laws of the importing country. Consequently, determinations of 
dumping and subsidization can be different in each country but
19FTA, Article 1911 defines the standard of review. In 
Canada the standard of review under the FTA is adopted from 
s.18.1(4) of the Federal Court Act. S.C. 1985, c.F-7 as 
amended, while the standard of review applicable in the United 
States is adopted from s.516A(b)(l) of the Tariff Act of 1930. 
See generally Gary Horlick and Amanda DeBusk, "The Functioning 
of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement Dispute Resolution 
Panels," in Leonard Waverman, ed., Negotiating and Implementing 
a North American Free Trade Agreement. Toronto: The Fraser 
Institute, 1992, 1; and, Stewart Abercrombie Baker, "Chapter 
Nineteen: The Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Laws," 
Unpublished Article, 1991.
will still be upheld as long as the administrative agency made 
its determination in accordance with domestic law.
Review of the panel's decision is very limited. There is 
no appeal mechanism in the FTA to challenge a panel's findings 
on the grounds of legal or factual error. Only where there are 
allegations of gross misconduct, bias, serious conflict of 
interest or other material violation of the rules of conduct by 
a panelist, or there is a serious departure from a fundamental 
rule of procedure by the panel, or if the action by the panel 
is manifestly in excess of its powers, authority or 
jurisdiction; and any of the actions outlined above materially 
affected the panel's decision or threatened the integrity of 
the review process, can the extraordinary challenge procedures 
by invoked.20
Through November 1992, thirty Chapter 19 cases have been 
initiated, plus one Extraordinary Challenge.21 Of these cases,
24 were directed against U.S. agencies (ie. the Department of 
Commerce (DOC) or the International Trade Commission (ITC)). 
Fifteen of these cases have been completed while nine remain 
active. Six cases have been initiated against Canadian agencies 
(ie. Revenue Canada (RC) or the Canadian International Trade 
Tribunal (CITT)). Three of these cases have been completed 
while 3 remain active. One of the 6 cases against Canadian
20FTA, Article 1904.
21Status Report of Cases (chapters 18 and 19) Canada-U. S. 
FTA Binational Secretariat, Canadian Section, November 1992.
15
agencies was launched by a Canadian petitioner, while the rest 
were launched by U.S. petitioners. All of the cases against 
U.S. agencies were brought by Canadian petitioners, although in 
seven of these cases U.S. petitioners were also present. 
Overall, Canadians have been the major users of Chapter 19 
procedures, and the main respondents have been U.S. agencies.
The results of Chapter 19 actions are that about half of 
the cases resulted in a remand in whole or in part; that is, 
the determination was returned to the agency for "action not 
inconsistent with the panel's decision."22 In the two Canadian 
cases completed, the actions of the agency were affirmed in one 
panel and remanded in the other. For the completed U.S. cases,
4 were remanded and four were affirmed.23 Approximately similar 
results in the United States were produced by the Court of 
International Trade in the period prior to the FTA.
The overall judgment of the Chapter 19 mechanism is that 
the panel process has worked effectively, In a lengthy review 
of dispute settlement in the FTA, Professor Andreas Lowenfeld 
of New York University has written that: "[a]11 things 
considered, the unique binational dispute settlement mechanism 
created by the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement have
1 6
22FTA, Art. 1904 (8).
23Cases can be remanded in whole or in part, hence a 
"remand" may be a relatively insignificant action.
worked extraordinarily well."24 Especially, Lowenfeld notes 
that the panels have conscientiously applied the law of the 
country in which the case arose. Panel decisions have not 
reflected a bias for or against trade remedy legislation. Most 
important, panels have not reflected nationalistic behaviour, 
for panelists have dealt objectively with legal issues and have 
not attempted to push a Canadian or American approach to the 
cases.
17
III. AD duties and CVDs in the NAFTA25
Like Canada in the FTA negotiations, Mexico aimed to 
achieve greater and more secure access to the U.S. market by 
negotiating a NAFTA with the United States and Canada. In 
recent years, Mexico has increasingly found itself at the 
receiving end of U.S. AD actions.26 Between 1980-1990, eight
24Andreas F. Lowenfeld, "Binational Dispute Settlement 
under Chapters 18 and 19 of the Canada-United States Free Trade 
Agreement: An Interim Appraisal" Administrative Conference of 
the United States, December 1990, 78.
25Michael Hart, A North American Free Trade Agreement. 
Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1990, 126-127.
26Stephen J. Powell, Craig R. Giesse, and Craig L. Jackson, 
"Current Administration of U.S. Antidumping and Countervailing 
Duty Laws: Implications for Prospective U.S.-Mexico Free Trade 
Talks," 11 Northwestern Journal of International Law and 
Business (1990), 179. Mexico has not encountered the same 
problem with countervailing duty actions as Canada since it 
signed the "Understanding on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties" with the United States in 1986 and pursuant to its 
obligations under the Agreement, substantially altered its 
subsidy practice. See Celia R. Siac, "Does Mexico Subsidize too 
Much? Perceptions versus Reality," Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute 
Commentary No. 36, February 1992, 6.
actions were initiated by U.S. companies against Mexican 
producers.27 Although AD practices have become more 
standardized amongst GATT members, there still remains some 
discrepancy in their usage and interpretation due to the lack 
of precision in the wording of the GATT's AD rules and 
procedures, although not to the same extent as with CVDs.28 
Binational review as exists in Chapter 19 of the FTA can reduce 
the possibility of abuse by promoting the consistent 
application of domestic trade remedy laws and regulations 
through the involvement of panelists from the countries party 
to the dispute. Thus, a Chapter 19-like mechanism could provide 
an adequate legal solution to an otherwise political problem.
However, even though the dispute settlement mechanism in 
Chapter 19 of the FTA has worked well in a bilateral context 
between Canada and the United States, this did not mean that it 
is was necessarily suitable for NAFTA or other agreements.
There were a variety of obstacles and concerns raised by the 
possible extension of the FTA's dispute settlement mechanism to 
Mexico. The purpose of this section is to discuss some of these 
obstacles, as well as the implications of extending a Chapter
1 8
27These include: Carbon Steel Wire Rod; Oil Country Tubular 
Goods; Welded Steel Wire Fabric; Porcelain-On-Steel Cooking 
Ware; Certain Fresh Cut Flowers; Portland Hydraulic Cement; 
Certain Steel Pails and Gray Portland Cement & Clinker; taken 
from U.S. ITC Annual Reports 1980-1989.
28William B. Carmichael, "Review of the Customs Tariff, 
(Antidumping) Act,” Submission to the Gruen Review Canberra, 
1986, as referred to in Finger and Olechowski, ibid.. 159.
19-like mechanism to NAFTA. The discussion is certainly not 
exhaustive, but gives some indication of what problems or 
concerns were dealt with at the negotiating table before a deal 
on this point was struck.
Before delving into the issues that were raised by the 
question of extending a Chapter 19 mechanism to NAFTA it is 
useful to outline briefly the nature of Mexico's current unfair 
trade remedy system.
1. The Nature of Mexico's AD and CVD System
Mexico's primary pieces of legislation governing AD duty 
and CVD actions are The Foreign Trade Regulatory Act29 (Act) 
and Regulations Against Unfair International Trade Practices 
(Regulations) .30 The agency responsible for AD and CVD actions 
is the Secretaria de Comercio v Fomento Industrial (SECOFI), a 
division of the budget and finance ministry, with the Comisión 
de Aranceles v Controles al Comercio Exterior (CACCE)31 
providing consultative support particularly on the issue of 
duty assessments.
SECOFI conducts up to two investigations leading to
29Decreto por el que se Crea la Ley Reglamentaria del 
Articulo 131 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos 
Mexicanos en Materia de Comercio Exterior, D.O., Jan. 13, 1986.
30Reglamento Contra Practicas Desleales del Comercio 
Internacional, D.O., Nov. 25, 1987.
31CACCE can be translated as the Committee on Foreign Trade 
Tariffs and Controls. Ernesto Rubio del Cueto, "Countervailing 
Duties Affecting United States-Mexican Trade", 12 Houston 
Journal of International Law (1990) 323.
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provisional duty assessments and a third culminating in a final 
determination. In order to make a positive finding, SECOFI must 
determine that an unfair practice (dumping or subsidization) 
exists in conjunction with a finding of injury to the domestic 
industry. Final affirmative determinations may be appealed by 
Mexican importers to the Federal Fiscal Tribunal (FFT) on 
grounds outlined in the Código Fiscal (Fiscal Code), such as 
the incompetence of officials or a breach of formal 
requirements. In addition, the Mexican Constitution provides a 
supplemental remedy known as amparo that can be requested where 
a guaranteed individual right was breached during the 
administrative process and had an impact on the outcome of the 
action. The significance of the amparo procedure and remedy 
will be discussed in greater detail below.
Mexico's AD provisions have been invoked often since 1987. 
Between 1987-1989, 35 AD proceedings were initiated, 15 of 
which were against U.S. imports. The majority of cases against 
the United States were initiated in 1987 with only 2 being 
initiated in 1988 and 1989 each, thus indicating a decline in 
their initiation.32 Mexico's CVD provisions have been invoked 
considerably less, with only one case being initiated against 
Malaysia over the same time period.
2. Technical Issues of Incorporating Mexico into a Chapter 19
From an organizational perspective, there were both
32USITC, Review of Trade and Investment Measures bv Mexico. 
USITC Report No. 2275 (April 1990), 4-17.
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technical and substantive concerns raised by the potential 
extension of Chapter 19 to Mexico. We begin with the technical 
impediments, three of which will be discussed. First, the 
Chapter 19 mechanism of the FTA was drafted in a bilateral 
context rather than in a trilateral (or multilateral context) 
such as NAFTA (or WHFTA). This raised the question whether the 
mechanism would be amended to reflect trinational as opposed to 
binational review. There were a number of forms such an 
amendment could have taken. For example, one option was 
binational review by the parties directly involved in the 
dispute with the third party having a right to participate in 
the hearing as a litigant but without national representation 
on the panel. This option required relatively minor changes to 
the current structure and functioning of the mechanism. 
Trinational panel review may not have been as appealing since a 
non-party to the dispute would effectively be involved in the 
reviewing process and conceivably complicate as opposed to 
facilitate the decision-making process. In the end, binational 
dispute resolution was negotiated into the NAFTA.
The second and third technical issues are more serious and 
involve Mexico's Constitution. The second problem deals 
directly with Mexico's adherence to the Calvo doctrine of law, 
which subscribes to the notion that where legal disputes arise 
between Mexican and foreign business partners, Mexican internal
21
remedies should be used to the exclusion of international 
ones.33 Some Latin American states, including Mexico, have 
adopted,a provision in their Constitution requiring foreigners 
who have been granted certain rights to abstain from seeking 
the protection of their governments where a dispute concerning 
those rights arises. This clause raised the issue whether 
recourse to binational panels was valid under Mexican law since 
the panels might be perceived as granting a form of protection 
by a foreign government.34 Apparently this provision did not 
pose a real threat to adopting binational review under NAFTA 
and was effectively dealt with early on in the Chapter 19 
negotiations. However, in the context of a WHFTA, this issue 
will be raised again since so many Latin American states 
incorporate a form of Calvo clause in their constitutions.
The third technical problem involves Mexico's writ of 
amparo, which was mentioned earlier. As indicated above, the 
writ of amparo is a legal device which provides for a process 
and remedy to redress violations of constitutionally protected 
individual rights which have caused a person injury.35 Article
33Dr. James C. Baker and Lois J. Yoder, "ICSID and the 
Calvo Clause a Hindrance to Foreign Direct Investment in the 
LDCs", 5 Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution (1989), 75.
^Donald R. Shea, The Calvo Clause: A Problem of Inter- 
American and International Law and Diplomacy. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 6.
35For an indepth discussion of amparo see Hector Fix 
Zamudio, "A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo" 9 
California Western International law Journal. (1979), 306-348.
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103 of Mexico's Constitution establishes the basis of recourse 
through an amparo proceeding while Article 107 regulates its 
operation.
In the context of AD and CVD actions, the writ of amparo 
provides recourse for infringements of individual due process 
rights by SECOFI as established under Article 14 of the 
Constitution where all other remedies have been exhausted.
There would appear to be two possible implications of this 
device for the adoption of binational review into NAFTA. First, 
amparo may be used to challenge the constitutionality of a law, 
such as whether binational review violates Article 27 of the 
Mexican Constitution which requires recourse to Mexican 
institutions for resolution of disputes involving foreigners, 
ie. the Calvo clause discussed above. If a court should find 
the law unconstitutional, it could conceivably invalidate the 
specific decision over which amparo was invoked but not strike 
down the law generally.
The second implication of amparo on binational review 
involves more directly recourse to amparo for violations of 
individual procedural and substantive rights during the course 
of administrative proceedings as opposed to the 
constitutionality of the law under which a decision was made.
In such cases, administrative reviews by the Federal Fiscal 
Tribunal of SECOFI's final determinations can be subject to 
review by district courts, collegiate courts or the Supreme 
Court depending on a variety of factors.
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In administrative proceedings in the NAFTA context, the 
issues that arise are of a dual nature. One type involves the 
impact of amparo on the right to judicial review, where 
petitioners seek review of SECOFI's actions in domestic courts 
in place of binational review. For example, recourse to amparo 
would appear to be limited to Mexican importers and exporters, 
thereby excluding recourse by non-residents. Furthermore, the 
grounds for review in an amparo action are not very 
transparent. This makes it difficult for foreigner nationals to 
understand how the mechanism works and the law is applied.
The second type, which is of far greater concern for 
judicial review by binational panels, is that the amparo 
process could undermine the finality of panel decisions.
Because the right to petition review of an administrative 
decision under amparo is constitutionally entrenched, if a 
party meets the basic requirements to invoke amparo. it would 
seem this remedy cannot be denied. If this is the case, 
decisions by binational panels would be subject to review by a 
superior domestic court. This would consequently undermine one 
of the primary purposes of the binational panel, which is to be 
the final arbiter in an AD or CVD dispute.
3. Substantive Issues Raised bv Chapter 19
Numerous substantive issues were also raised in 
contemplation of extending a Chapter 19-like mechanism to 
Mexico. By way of summary, two major substantive problems
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needed to be considered. First, the FTA mechanism in the 
trilateral context contemplates the application of Mexican law 
by the reviewing body to disputes involving the determination 
of an unfair trade practice. The problem can be stated in this 
manner: because of a common legal background in the United 
States and Canada, the dispute mechanism in Chapter 19 of the 
FTA inherently contains within it certain standards applicable 
to due process and judicial review. However, concern was raised 
during the NAFTA negotiations that because of the differing 
legal and administrative traditions in Mexico the standards of 
due process and judicial review, inherent in the functioning of 
the mechanism between Canada and the United States, would be 
lowered in the trilateral context. These concerns focused, 
inter alia, on the enforcement of deadlines, the suitability of 
the written record for judicial review and the absence of 
potential bias in the administration of AD and CVD actions.
Second, there are specific differences between Mexico's 
trade law administration and those of Canada and the United 
States. The Mexican administration is less favourable to 
affected parties than the Canadian and U.S. systems. These 
differences will be highlighted below once the potentially 
lower standard of due process and judicial review inherent in 
the application of Mexican law to trade disputes is discussed. 
How these issues have been dealt with in NAFTA will follow this 
discussion.
It has been stated that the success of the FTA's mechanism
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is largely due to the fact that Canada and the United States 
share similar legal traditions and unfair trade remedy systems. 
One of the overriding factors in the NAFTA situation is that 
the parties do not share a common legal tradition. Mexico's 
system is based on the civil law whereas Canada and the United 
States have systems based on the common law. A general 
comparison between Mexican civil law and the common law in 
Canada and the United States is beyond the scope of this paper. 
For our present purposes it is sufficient to suggest that the 
approach to the application and interpretation of law in each 
of these systems is conceptually different and ultimately 
results in a disparity between the two systems.36
The differences between the two systems were not a barrier 
to extending Chapter 19 to NAFTA. However, the lack of 
experience of Mexican and American/Canadian lawyers and 
administrators with each other's legal systems would doubtless 
have generated some lack of confidence in the effectiveness of
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36For example, while law is created under the common law by 
judges interpreting legislation in conjunction with cases 
establishing legal precedents, the civil law tradition is rule 
based, with limited authority given to judges to actually 
impose their own interpretation on the legislation. Civil law 
judges look at the text of specific rules to determine whether 
the text applies to a specific fact situation. Under the common 
law, judges have the power to modify or add to the law through 
the application of specific rules of interpretation. See 
Fernando Orrantia, "Conceptual Differences Between the Civil 
Law System and the Common Law System", 19 Southwestern 
University Law Review. (1990), 1164-1165.
the panel process in NAFTA.37 Although no transitional period 
was incorporated into the NAFTA Chapter 19 to ensure that 
lawyers and officials familiarize themselves with foreign 
procedures of judicial review, it appears likely that some time 
will pass before Mexico, in particular, has an opportunity to 
incorporate the changes to its unfair trade remedy rules and 
administration required under the NAFTA. The time lapse should 
help ensure a higher level of confidence in the mechanism all 
round.
A major problem as to whether a Chapter 19-like mechanism 
was suitable for NAFTA involved differences between the manner 
of conducting administrative proceedings in Mexico compared to 
the United States and Canada. In the United States and Canada 
it is considered extremely important that procedural safeguards 
are incorporated into the structure and regulations governing 
an administrative agency's conduct in order to protect 
individuals from potential abuse of state authority. When a 
superior body is asked to review the decision of an 
administrative body to see if it was made in accordance with 
law, this can include making a finding as to whether the agency 
acted outside the scope of its powers or whether it breached a 
procedural requirement, thereby affecting an individual's right 
to due process or natural justice.
37Peter Mor ici: "Trade Talks with Mexico: A Time for 
Realism", Unpublished Article, University of Maine, April 1991, 
38.
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As indicated earlier, the essence of Chapter 19 is that it 
requires a binational panel to assess whether an agency made 
its determination in accordance with domestic law.
Consequently, if specific procedural safeguards governing the 
conduct of an agency's investigation and duty assessments are 
not incorporated into one party's administrative system, this 
will lower the value of binational review for all parties 
involved in a dispute.
In Canada and the United States there are generally high 
standards of transparency, due process and structural 
safeguards to guarantee an absence of bias in the decision­
making process. These are incorporated into the conduct of 
administrative proceedings and ensure that decisions are made 
in a quasi-judicial manner. The different standards of these 
three aspects of Mexico's system in relation to the Canadian 
and U.S. systems under binational review will be focused on in 
the following discussion.
(i). Transparency
Transparency is a key element of the law governing the 
conduct of Canadian and U.S. administrative bodies. The 
standard of transparency in Canada and the United States 
generally requires that the law applicable to an administrative 
agency be set down in a clear and concise fashion and be 
accessible to the public. Furthermore, the agency's conduct in 
performing its duties must be evident in order that its 
practice can be properly reviewed by a superior body to
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determine whether the agency fulfilled its duties in accordance 
with the law.38
These same standards are not inherent aspects of Mexico's 
unfair trade law administration. Mexico's system is 
characterized by very general rules and regulations providing 
SECOFI with broad discretionary powers to perform its duties. 
SECOFI's broad powers of discretion emanate in part from the 
fact that there is limited transparency in how SECOFI's 
investigations and determinations of unfair trade practices are 
actually carried out. This fact has implications for the 
standard of judicial review under a Chapter 19-like mechanism. 
More specifically, two examples highlight the absence of 
transparency and the problems this poses to the standard of 
review under a Chapter 19-like mechanism.
First, SECOFI's time frame for conducting its 
investigation and making its dumping, subsidy or injury 
assessments does not reflect the time frame envisioned by. the 
Regulations. In fact, numerous deadlines governing various 
stages of the proceedings are not adhered to. According to the 
law, SECOFI is required to initiate an investigation within 
five days of receipt of a petition. If it finds sufficient
38For example, in Canadian and U.S. AD and CVD actions, the 
agency is obliged to complete an administrative record (AR) of 
the evidence provided by counsel for the parties in a case. 
Decisions of the agency must be substantiated by the evidence 
in the AR. A reviewing court (or a binational panel) will 
scrutinize the same evidence used by the agency (ie. the AR) , 
and if it finds the agency's decision cannot be substantiated 
by evidence,the action can be remanded to the agency.
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evidence to sustain a preliminary determination of dumping or 
subsidization in conjunction with an injury finding, a second 
investigation must be conducted after which a revised 
assessment regarding the amount of the duty to be imposed must 
be made within 30 days of the commencement of the 
investigation. According to the Regulations, the final 
determination must be completed within 60 of the 
investigation's initiation. In fact, SECOFI's practice does not 
reflect this process. SECOFI usually launches a formal 
investigation within three months of receiving a petition, and 
requires at least a week (although it could take as long as a 
month) before a first provisional assessment is made.39 The 
extension of deadlines is widespread throughout Mexico's unfair 
trade law administration. Consequently, although SECOFI is 
required to complete its investigation within six months, it 
usually takes between 15 and 18 months for completion once the 
proceedings are initiated, or 18 to 21 months from the filing 
date.40
A second problem with transparency in Mexico's trade 
administration relates to the compilation of the administrative
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39USITC, Review of Trade and Investment Measures bv Mexico. 
USITC Report No. 2275 (April 1990), 4-14.
40Regarding time frame, it appears SECOFI's actual practice 
is more liberal than its written regulations. However, SECOFI's 
practice disadvantages exporters by creating legal uncertainty 
about deadlines; and, where procedures drag on extensively, by 
requiring exporters to pay duties while making a final 
determination.
record. There are no explicit provisions in the Regulations 
outlining what should constitute the administrative record in a 
case. SECOFI can, therefore, effectively determine what should 
or should not be included in the written record. This use of 
discretion means that the record compiled is inadequate for the 
purposes of judicial review under a Chapter 19-like mechanism.
A detailed record of the agency's actions is central to the 
appeal process. Without a proper record a binational panel 
cannot effectively review the agency's practices and determine 
whether the challenged order was dealt with properly at the 
lower stages of the investigation and assessment of the amount 
of the duty.
The absence of a sufficient degree of transparency in an 
agency's governing legislation and practice may adversely 
affect a party's interests. The uncertainty as to the time­
frame for SECOFI's investigations and duty assessments may 
impair the ability of parties to prepare properly for 
participation in the assessment process and payment of the 
duty. Moreover, parties may be unable to criticize an agency 
for unfair treatment where the agency appears to have acted 
within its broad discretionary powers. This problem is 
compounded by the fact that an absence of clear guidelines 
governing the compilation of the administrative record means 
that a superior body cannot fully know how an agency performed 
its duties, and therefore, assess whether its actions met 
certain procedural standards intended to protect individuals
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from an abuse of agency power.
(ii). Due Process
SECOFI's non-adherence to the deadlines as envisioned by 
the Regulations raises another major concern about the 
extension of Chapter 19 in terms of the standard of due process 
in Mexico's unfair trade law administration. Due process 
requires that individuals whose interests are affected by an 
administrative action are given adequate notice of the action 
and a sufficient opportunity to respond to it. Mexico's 
deadlines did not meet GATT standards of due process at the 
time it became a Contracting Party to the GATT, therefore it 
extended them in practice. Even though SECOFI does not adhere 
to the deadlines, because they reflect the law they are 
applicable under binational review.
In the United States, the analogous remedy to the 
imposition of a provisional duty under Mexico's Regulations 
requires the posting of a cash bond for every allegedly 
subsidized or dumped product, but it cannot be imposed until at 
least 90 days after the filing of an AD or CVD petition. Canada 
usually makes its dumping or subsidy determinations within 90 
days, at which time it may impose provisional duties. Both 
these situations allow the affected industry to participate to 
some extent in the investigation and assessment of the 
provisional duty.
A clear example of problems with due process is reflected 
by the time frame established under the Regulations for SECOFI
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to conduct its investigations and duty assessments. As stated 
earlier, SECOFI must initiate an investigation within 5 days of 
receiving a petition. The Regulations moreover contemplate the 
application of a first provisional duty within 5 days of the 
initiation of the investigation. Notice of both the initiation 
of the investigation and the first provisional duty assessment 
must be published in the Diario Oficial41. These deadlines 
conceivably permit the simultaneous publication of the 
initiation of the investigation and the imposition of a 
provisional duty. Under these legal requirements a potential 
respondent could be left unaware of both the preliminary 
investigation until it is published and the provisional duty 
until it is imposed. Consequently, an interested party could in 
law be required to pay a duty without being forewarned or 
having an opportunity to participate in the assessment process. 
An additional point is that SECOFI bases its first provisional 
duty assessment on information from an international data bank 
and not on data from the specific industry, which prevents 
exporters from providing information in support of their 
individual circumstances.
The Mexican system currently provides a lower standard of 
due process than in Canada and the United States with respect 
to who has the authority to appeal a final determination of 
SECOFI. According to the Código Fiscal, only importers of goods
41The Diario Oficial is Mexico's equivalent to the Canada 
Gazette and the Federal Register in the United States.
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have standing to appeal an affirmative finding of an unfair 
trade practice. Exporters and domestic producers are prohibited 
from doing so. Thus, Canadian and U.S. exporters are currently 
unable to appeal decisions by SECOFI and, therefore, would be 
unable to request binational review under a Chapter 19 
mechanism.
(iii). Structural Safeguards
Another element important to the common law notion of 
effective judicial review is the requirement that 
administrative agencies act independently or semi-independently 
of the government. In the case of AD and CVD determinations, 
this is necessary in order to de-politicize the process and to 
ensure greater objectivity in the agencies' decisions. In 
addition, it is considered important that the injury 
determinations and dumping and subsidy assessments be made by 
two different agencies in order to prevent potential bias in 
the final decision.
The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) and the 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT) are independent 
bodies responsible for material injury determinations.
Moreover, their determinations are made independent of the 
dumping or subsidy findings by the International Trade 
Administration (ITA) of the Department of Commerce (DOC) and 
the Assessment Programs Division of Revenue Canada (RC). The 
roles of the CITT, ITC and ITA as regulatory agencies are both 
adjudicatory and investigative. Although the ITA is a branch of
34
the DOC, it acts in a quasi-judicial manner independent of the 
DOC. Revenue Canada's situation is somewhat different. It does 
not technically conform to the requirement of semi­
independence, since it is more closely connected with the 
federal revenue department, a fact that has been criticized by 
the United States. However, its determinations are reviewable 
according to the same standards as the injury findings of the 
CITT and, therefore, are at least minimally acceptable. In 
spite of RC's unique situation, the semi-independence of the 
agencies responsible for dumping and subsidy determinations is 
still considered an important quality for effective judicial 
review.
As indicated above, dumping and subsidy determinations as 
well as injury findings are made in Mexico by SECOFI, 
effectively the Department of Commerce, and influenced by 
CACCE, an interagency working group consisting of officials 
from SECOFI and other executive agencies. The Comisión de 
Aranceles y Controles al Comercio Exterior advises SECOFI on 
the level of duty to be applied, as well as the content of 
SECOFI's final resolution regarding the investigated 
merchandise.
SECOFI is neither independent nor semi-independent from 
the government. Moreover, dumping and subsidy determinations 
are not necessarily made independent of its injury assessments. 
Given this fact, there is concern that SECOFI's findings may be 
either politically influenced or affected by its findings in
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the other category; ie. a finding of dumping could be construed 
as providing evidence that there is injury and, therefore, 
improper by common law standards.
Without transparency in the laws and proceedings, high 
standards of due process and the independence or semi- 
independence of the administrative bodies from the government, 
judicial review is hollow and ineffective. SECOFI's broad 
powers of discretion emanating from the lack of transparency in 
Mexico's unfair trade law administration means that there is 
potential for SECOFI's deadlines, as well as duty assessments 
to be influenced by interested parties and government. Without 
the incorporation of higher standards in the way Mexico's trade 
law administration is conducted, a chapter 19 dispute 
settlement mechanism in NAFTA would not be suitable.
Due process and the standard of judicial review aside, 
there are specific elements of Mexico's unfair trade law 
administration which are not as favourable to affected parties 
as the equivalent Canadian and U.S. provisions. The following 
will focus on some of these differences.
In Mexico, the proceedings culminating in a final 
determination are in practice considerably longer than in 
Canada and the United States. In the United States, a final 
determination must be made between 205 and 300 days after a 
countervailing duty petition is filed or between 280 and 420 
days after the filing of an antidumping petition. In Canada, 
the CITT must make its final determination within 120 days
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after receiving notice of the preliminary determination from 
Revenue Canada. As indicated earlier, in Mexico, the complete 
process, culminating in a final determination, usually takes 18 
to 21 months from the date the petition is filed. The length of 
the proceedings can have an impact on interested parties in 
Mexico in part because once a preliminary dumping or subsidy 
determination is made and a provisional duty is imposed, the 
affected importers must continue paying the duty until it is 
either finalized or revoked. This could be costly and 
detrimental to both importers and producers especially where 
the preliminary finding is found unsubstantiated in subsequent 
investigations.
Another difference among the parties' laws involves the 
timing of review of duty orders. Annual review of duty orders 
is required in the U.S., while it is suggested for dumping 
values and subsidy amounts in Canada as well. The CITT may 
review its injury findings at its discretion. However, if a 
review is not initiated within five days of the original order, 
the order is automatically rescinded. In Mexico, such review is 
discretionary. It can be initiated by SECOFI at the request of 
an interested party or ex officio, where it appears justified 
in doing so. Once again, it is SECOFI's discretion that may 
unfavourably affect Canadian and U.S.' exporters. Under Mexican 
law there is no consistency in SECOFI's initiation of review 
proceedings. Moreover, SECOFI is under no obligation to do so. 
Thus, there currently exists the potential that SECOFI's
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initiation or non-initiation of a review could be politically 
influenced.
To sum up the discussions of section III, it is apparent 
that Mexico's AD and CVD system differed substantially from 
that of Canada and the United States. However, the basis for 
Chapter 19 in the FTA was the underlying compatibility of 
Canadian and American legislation and administrative practices 
on AD and CVDs. The result is that if Mexico were to seek to 
negotiate a dispute settlement system similar to Chapter 19 of 
the FTA, some basic accommodation between the Mexican systems, 
and the Canadian and American systems, would be necessary. This 
same choice will face other parties seeking to negotiate a
WHFTA or to accede to NAFTA.
IV. Conclusion
AD and CVDs were a major issue in the Canada-U.S. FTA, but
until recently this subject was not on the table at the NAFTA.
However, in early May, 1992, negotiations on AD and CVD were 
fully joined, and Mexican negotiators indicated a great 
interest to conclude an agreement on this issue roughly along 
the lines of Chapter 19 in the FTA. Likely Mexico took this 
course because trade policy has become judicialized within GATT 
and elsewhere, and because trade relations themselves are 
becoming more litigious. This can be seen as an inevitable 
reaction to the greater exposure national economies have toward 
each other as a result of trade liberalization. Law suits are a
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form of conflict between people who do business with each 
other, not between people who are distant, and as trade 
relations increase it seems likely disputes over unfair trade 
will increase as well.
There were similarities between how Canada and Mexico 
approached AD and CVDs in a regional trade agreement, which may 
provide clues as to how this issue might play out in a WHFTA. 
First, both Canada and Mexico recognized that resort to unfair 
trade remedies by the larger trade partner - the United 
States - could threaten security of access to the U.S. market, 
and therefore undercut the value of a trade agreement. Second, 
both Canada and Mexico sought an exception from U.S. unfair 
trade legislation, and failed. Third, Canada and Mexico tried 
to negotiate a broader understanding over the use of AD duties 
and CVDs, but also failed.42 Finally, both countries settled 
on a binding dispute settlement mechanism, built around an 
internationalized form of judicial review of domestic agency 
actions, as a surrogate for a more permanent solution to the 
problem of antidumping and countervail between close trading 
partners.
There were three important changes negotiated to Chapter 
19 in order that Mexico, Canada and the United States could
42In case of AD duties, such an understanding might be the 
use of national competition policy as an alternative to AD 
actions. For CVDs, an understanding might be a Subsidies Code 
negotiated on a North American basis, or the adoption of a 
Subsidies Code in the Uruguay Round.
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reach agreement in the NAFTA. First, the NAFTA includes a 
section (Article 1907:3) that outlines desirable qualities for 
the administration of antidumping and countervailing duty 
laws.43 This change (as well as the two following changes) were 
added to NAFTA to ensure that Mexico's trade remedy system is 
sufficiently similar to that of Canada and the United States to 
make a Chapter 19 mechanism suitable; and if not, to ensure 
that adequate remedial provisions are incorporated into the 
Agreement to protect the other Parties. The rationale 
underlying these changes is that Chapter 19 presupposes a 
binational panel will apply the domestic law of the Party whose 
agency's determination is being challenged. Where a Party's 
administrative procedures, statutes, or standard of judicial 
review do not match, or at least come close to, those found in 
the other Parties' unfair trade remedy systems, interested 
nationals of those other Parties may not receive a standard of 
due process equivalent to that extended by their governments to 
foreign exporters.
Second, the NAFTA includes a section (Annex 1904.15(d) 
Schedule B) that outlines a series of twenty obligatory 
amendments to Mexico's unfair trade remedy regime similar to 
that of Canada and the United States. The proposed amendments
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43For example, "publish notice of initiation of 
investigations"; "provide disclosure of relevant information 
... [including] ... an explanation of the calculation or the 
methodology used to determine the margin of dumping or the 
amount of subsidy"; and so forth.
are mainly procedural, and are intended to address the low 
standards of due process that are characteristic of Mexico's 
unfair trade remedy legislation.44 For example, there are 
requirements that Mexican legislation shall provide explicit 
timetables for administrative proceedings, participation by 
interested parties, and timely access to all non-confidential 
information. The Mexican law that allows for the imposition of 
duties only five days after receipt of a petition must be 
changed, and, as well Mexico's recognition of parties having 
standing to request judicial review must be expanded to include 
foreign producers and exporters which were formerly excluded 
from seeking judicial review of an agency's determination. 
Perhaps most importantly, Mexico will be required to compile a 
comprehensive administrative record of the proceedings of the 
investigating agency and a detailed statement of legal 
reasoning underlying the agency determination, which is the 
basis for judicial review by a binational panel.
Third, under the title of "Safeguarding the Panel Review 
System", the NAFTA includes a section (Article 1905) that 
provides remedies if a Party does not comply with its 
obligations under Chapter 19. If the application of a Party's 
domestic law prevents a binational panel from carrying out its 
functions, the NAFTA provides recourse to consultation and then 
to a Special Committee of three individuals selected from the
^It is probable that Mexico provides greater due process 
in practice than that required by Mexican law.
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same roster used for the purpose of establishing Extraordinary 
Challenge Committees.45 If the Committee finds a Party has not 
complied with Chapter 19 the complaining Party can suspend 
binational panel review or equivalent "appropriate" benefits 
with respect to that Party. Article 1905 further provides that 
binational panel reviews between the disputing Parties will be 
stayed, and will revert to domestic courts if necessary; and it 
gives the Party complained against rights to retaliate in kind 
to a suspension of binational panel review by the complaining 
Party. In the event the Party initially complained against 
removes the cause for complaint, provision is made to reconvene 
a Special Committee to assess the situation, and then to 
terminate counter-measures if appropriate. To sum up, if 
appears that-given the successful history of Chapter 19 in the 
FTA it is unlikely a Special Committee would arise between 
Canada and the United States, but it may form a useful sanction 
to ensure that Mexico (or any other country acceding to the 
NAFTA) adopts the domestic practices necessary to implement 
Article 19. However, it is unlikely the extension of Chapter 19 
to Mexico could survive any substantial use of Article 1905, 
since that article essentially signals a breakdown of the 
undertakings of Chapter 19 itself.
If other hemispheric nations were to accede to NAFTA or
45Extraordinary Challenge Committees were provided for in 
the FTA to permit an appeal from a binational panel decision on 
grounds, inter alia, of misconduct or abuse of power. The NAFTA 
has a similar provision.
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negotiate a WHFTA, it is likely that a Chapter 19-like 
mechanism would appeal to them for the same reason it appealed 
to Canada or Mexico. A WHFTA negotiation would also raise some 
of the issues faced in the NAFTA negotiation, such as the role 
of amparo (which has been widely adopted in South America from 
the Mexican legal system) and the Calvo doctrine in dispute 
settlement procedures, as well as the nature and procedural 
standards of AD and CVD investigations and assessments and 
their consequent impact on the standards of judicial review and 
due process under a Chapter 19-like mechanism.
The extension of Chapter 19-like procedures to a WHFTA 
would likely have some positive payoff for Canada and the 
United States. Canada would gain because the principle of 
binational review of unfair trade actions - which was 
originally a Canadian demand - would be more firmly established 
in North American trade policy. For the United States, the 
issue is more complicated. One would expect there would be 
domestic opposition to any perceived weakening of U.S. control 
over unfair trade remedies. On the other hand, a Chapter 19- 
like process might advantage the United States (and Canada) by 
curbing the expansion of AD and CVD use in its southern 
neighbours. Mexico is now the third largest user of AD actions 
worldwide, and any expansion of AD and CVD practices in South 
America could limit the potential for American exports in the 
future. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that other Western 
Hemispheric nations will conduct unfair trade remedy procedures
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in the manner American exporters might feel entitled to. 
Ironically, the less foreign practices conform to American 
notions of due process, the greater the incentive to negotiate 
a dispute settlement mechanism. It the United States is 
seriously interested in negotiating a WHFTA, it is likely it 
will negotiate as well an internationalized legal regime to set 
limits on the national use of unfair trade remedies like AD and 
CVDs.


